|
|
|
|
|
| Marette, Stephan. |
| An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms' incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Inspection policies; Market regulation; Regulatory funding; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18351 |
| |
|
|
|
